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Abstract 
“Our tax system should be…fair, efficient, redistributive, enhancing welfare…”, but also “pro-
growth, flat, competitive, favoring business…”. These are only a few examples of statements 
politicians have made about the principles of tax policy. Of course, a tax system can be all those 
things, but not all at once. Hence, those statements reveal something about the dominant norms 
guiding tax policy. Is justice the purpose of tax policy? Or competitiveness?  
The incapacity of major powers to effectively ban tax evasion and tax avoidance (at least until 
recently) appears puzzling, as the labeled adversaries are mostly very small states without any 
economic weight. Focusing on norms can help to understand the issue: In 2004, Michael Webb 
pointed to transnational corporations as dominant voices in the discourse about tax policy and 
to prevailing norms among US policymakers that rather favored a “race to the bottom” in tax-
ation than effective international regulation. 
In the last years, something has changed: Civil society groups have called for tax justice and 
major events such as the financial crisis and the Panama papers have influenced public opinion. 
And indeed, some of the recent evolutions in international tax policy such as Automatic Infor-
mation Exchange and the BEPS project look promising. However, the sustainability of these 
measures depends on a sustained will of major states to enforce them, which in turn is favored 
by a shift of the dominant norms guiding tax policy.  
This paper attempts to find out whether such a norm-shift is about to occur. Using both quali-
tative and quantitative text-mining methods, general statements on tax policy by American pol-
iticians are identified in several thousand press articles and government sources covering the 
time span from 1997 to 2017 and their normative content is compared over time. 
The analysis reveals that neoliberal norms are still dominant in the American tax policy dis-
course, where as they cannot claim exclusivity. Most significant is the rise of economic nation-
alism over the last twenty years. 
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Introduction 
 
The main goal of this paper is to examine how policymakers in the USA justify tax policy, thus 
aiming to find out which are the dominant tax policy norms and how they evolved in the last 
decades. This question is relevant because norms fix the framework in which policy operates, 
which has a consequence on the likelihood for international cooperation that tackles the related 
problems of tax evasion, tax avoidance and real tax competition. Moreover, because of the US’ 
important structural position in the international financial system, what is said and thought 
about tax policy in the USA has an incidence on the establishment of comprehensive interna-
tional cooperation in matters of taxation. At the beginning of the millennium, Michael Webb 
described how neoliberal norms both among American and British leaders worked against the 
establishment of effective international cooperation in tax matters (Webb 2004). 
In the last twenty years, the global economy has undergone a lot of transformations, new voices 
in the discourse about tax policy have emerged and there is a lot of debate on how to interpret 
these evolutions.  
To describe the evolution of tax policy norms I conducted a semi-automatic content analysis on 
statements about tax policy extracted from US Congress publications and Associated Press 
news releases and classified the statements with the help of Robert Gilpin’s typology of ideo-
logies in the political economy. We will see that social-democratic norms, which are the only 
ones that are clearly favorable to cooperation in tax matters, are present in the discourse but 
have not gained on neoliberalism during the last twenty years. While neoliberalism becomes 
less dominant, economic nationalism, especially arguments about policy competitiveness, be-
come more important in the discourse about tax policy in the USA.  
At first I will explain the theoretical arguments for the importance of American tax policy norms 
for international cooperation in tax matters and introduce some concepts (1), then I will present 
an adapted version of Robert Gilpin’s typology of ideologies in the political economy that is 
useful for classifying tax policy justifications (2). Further, I will present research that has been 
conducted on norms and taxation (3), explain my research methodology (4), describe the evo-
lution of norms over the last twenty years (5) and finally offer some interpretations (6).  
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1. Theoretical context 
In the international system, the related issues of tax evasion, tax avoidance and real tax compe-
tition (all concern a shift of the tax burden from mobile to immobile capital and individuals)1 
can be explained as an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma2 (Dietsch, Rixen 2016, p. 7). Large 
states, such as the United States and the big states of the European Union, in theory prefer 
collective cooperation over defection (Dietsch, Rixen 2016, p. 7), principally because interna-
tional tax competition limits large states’ capacity to raise revenue and to choose their level of 
wealth and income redistribution, though the former effect is strongest for developing countries 
(Rixen 2016, p. 328). Small states always prefer defection over cooperation in theory since they 
can impose almost no taxes and can attract an international mobile tax base, which is extremely 
large compared to their size. But in the absence of cooperation between all states, large states 
also defect, for example by offering secrecy provisions for non-residents or lowering taxes on 
corporations.  
Currently the large states pursue a dual strategy: Some promising initiatives to cooperate against 
tax evasion and tax avoidance have been undertaken mostly under the auspices of the OECD, 
such as the Automatic Exchange of Information and the Base-Erosion and Profit-Shifting pro-
jects. But these initiatives do not make a complete cooperative regime. They still have several 
shortcomings, do not include many developing countries who suffer most from tax competition 
and do not enjoy full support of the USA. They also lack a strong enforcement mechanism, so 
there is a risk for mock compliance (Woodward 2016). 
And at the same time large states also persist in uncooperative behavior by offering secrecy 
provisions themselves or by participating in the “race-to-the-bottom” of taxation of the mobile 
tax base. For example, Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index ranks large countries 
such as the USA, Germany, Japan, and the UK among the top 15 secrecy jurisdictions. This 
high score is partly due to their important role in international financial flows, but also to the 
existence of prevailing secrecy provisions in domestic law (The Tax Justice Network 2017). 
Moreover, corporate tax rates in G20 countries have significantly fallen during the last 30 years 
                                                 
1 The terms of tax evasion and tax avoidance refer to mobile capital reducing itself its tax burden, leaving the 
burden with immobile capital. Tax competition is the voluntary reduction of mobile capital’s tax burden by gov-
ernments. However, if you consider that governments permit tax evasion and avoidance or combat it only half-
heartedly, these terms all appear as “three sides of the same coin”, namely an uncooperative fight by governments 
for the world’s mobile tax base and the investments that come along.  
2 A situation where the best outcome for the participants could be achieved through cooperation, but not knowing 
what the other would do, they prefer not to cooperate, because they know that if they behaved cooperatively and 
the counterpart did not reciprocate the behavior they would be worse off. 
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(from on average 40% in 1990 to 28,7% in 2015 (Berkhout 2016, p. 17)), while more of the tax 
burden is shifted towards consumption and labor taxes (OECD 2016).  
Now there is no need to be generally pessimistic regarding the resolution of prisoner’s dilem-
mas: In the domain of trade for example, the prisoner’s dilemma of protectionism vs. openness3 
has widely been overcome by strong institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization, which bears great resemblance to an 
institutional proposal that has been made for the case of taxes (Rixen 2016).  
Realist international relations theory explains the emergence of such cooperative regimes by 
the engagement of a leading nation, a hegemon, like the United Kingdom in the 19th century 
and the United States in the 20th century who are able to back institutions like the GATT and 
the WTO with the necessary power to prevent states from cheating (Gilpin 1987, p. 73). Alt-
hough large states such as the UK or the US surely profit from free trade, they are not the ones 
who profit the most, since they already dispose of a large interior market4.  
Why does the same not work for taxes? One could argue that one problem is the asymmetric 
nature of the prisoner’s dilemma: the fact, that small states are supposed to always prefer de-
fection over cooperation and would never be willing to sign a comprehensive convention. But 
large states can offer help to tax havens to develop alternative economic activities in exchange 
for cooperation (“side payments” in the jargon of game theory), or “persuade” tax havens to 
cooperation (one could also say “coerce”) for example by denying uncooperative states access 
to their financial markets (Hakelberg 2016; Stiglitz, Pieth 2016). The crucial point rather is that 
the powerful states of the world, especially the USA as most powerful state, must seriously 
back a strong regime. 
To better understand the whole picture, it is helpful to examine the prerequisites of the pris-
oner’s dilemma concept and abandon the idea that all states pursue the same fixed interests. For 
an institutional solution to a prisoner’s dilemma to come about, the relevant states must at first 
recognize that the situation is indeed a prisoner’s dilemma. This leads to the consideration of 
norms and ideas. Norms are important because they fix the framework in which policy operates. 
Robert Gilpin for example admits, that a liberal international economy – an economy where 
states behave cooperatively to permit the free exchange of goods and capital – is only possible 
if the leader among the states, the hegemon, is also committed to liberal values (Gilpin 1987, 
p. 72). With other words, the USA supported free trade because free trade was conforming to 
                                                 
3 In the absence of cooperation, a state usually prefers to impose tariffs to protect its economy.  
4 Smaller countries ripe more gains from trade: They can more easily specialize in the production of one good, as 
the production will be absorbed by the market of the large country. For example, trade divided by GDP was only 
0.28 for the United States, but 1.03 for Denmark in 2015 (World Bank 2017). 
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their conception of a good economic system, a system which leaves important decisions to the 
market and where the most important actor is the firm. But in the domain of taxation the norms 
might be different.  
To gain more empirical insights on this theoretical argument, this paper attempts to find out 
what the tax policy norms in the USA are and how they have evolved.  
 
But what are tax policy “norms”? According to Finnemore and Sikkink,  “there is general agree-
ment on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity” (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998, p. 891). The two important words in this definition are 
“appropriate“ and “standard”. “Appropriate” means that a norm contains a moral judgment. To 
recognize a norm from other kind of rules, one has to look if the rule has “the prescriptive (or 
evaluative) quality of ‘oughtness’” (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998, p. 891). Thus, a norm has its 
roots in a conception about what is good. “Standard” means that a norm is shared by a suffi-
ciently large group. Consequently, “norm-breaking generates disapproval […] and norm con-
forming behavior either […] produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internalized norm, 
because it is so taken for granted, […] provokes no reaction whatsoever” (Finnemore, Sikkink 
1998, p. 892). But how can we apply this concept to tax policy? 
The debate about one tax policy might be often very instrumentally oriented and there might be 
hundreds of different reasons why an individual might consider it right or wrong. But if we 
consider the purposes and the principles of tax policy or the tax system in general, the word 
norm makes more sense. So, a tax policy norm is the “appropriate behavior” for tax policy.  
In a democracy, there are reasons to believe that there is not really a consensus either what the 
purpose of tax policy should be, but that is because not all the people share the same political 
identity. They have different visions of the world, which leads us to another related term: Ide-
ology. Quite similar to a norm, an ideology is a set of normative beliefs. Usually, different 
ideologies struggle to shape the political system according to their conceptions of what is 
“good”. One can suppose that the general direction of policy and the conception of the national 
interest depend on which ideology is dominant at a certain point of time. 
 
2. Three different ideologies and their application 
According to Robert Gilpin there are three ideologies in political economy which struggle to 
impose their vision of the economic world: A liberal, a nationalist, and a Marxist perspective. 
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Also called mercantilism or protectionism, the ideology of economic nationalism considers that 
the economy should serve the interests of the state. Industrial development plays an important 
role. Purposes of economic policy are to promote national firms on the international stage and 
provide a strong welfare state domestically. Moreover, economic nationalism entails a zero-
sum worldview, which means that states compete for relative gains with each other. Gilpin calls 
“policy competitiveness” a “distinctive feature of contemporary mercantilism” (Gilpin 1987, 
p. 34). 
Underlying liberalism is the conviction that markets should be as free as possible and that the 
state’s role in the economy should be as limited as possible (Gilpin 1987, p. 27). Further, liberal 
political theory stresses the values of individual equality and liberty. At a difference with eco-
nomic nationalism, notions such as national interest do not play such an important role. The 
overall goals of liberal economic policy are efficiency, economic growth, and individual wel-
fare, achieved through the allocation of resources in a market (Gilpin 1987, p. 27).  
The problem with liberal ideology is, especially when we consider taxation, that the policies 
which can be derived from these values can be fundamentally different and even opposed to 
each other. In fact, since liberalism is in the United States considered as a core principle of 
society, the differences inside liberalism are important. These differences arise, as some of lib-
eralism’s goals can potentially be conflicting: Some liberals think for example that the ideal 
free market can only be achieved with strong state intervention that corrects market inefficien-
cies. People also disagree on whether equal treatment is sufficient for individual equality or 
whether a redistributive system should contribute to the achievement of equality. These oppo-
sitions lead to two main branches: Gilpin calls one “social-democratic”, in which state-inter-
vention is generally welcome to correct the deficiencies of the market (Gilpin 1987, p. 27). The 
other variant, which rejects too much intervention, could be called “neoliberal” or “libertarian” 
variant. When discussing the OECD Harmful Tax Competition debate, Michael Webb uses the 
terms “social democracy” and “liberal economic ideology” to essentially describe the same 
ideas (Webb 2004, p. 800). 
Thirdly, Marxist ideology’s central point is the critique of capitalism. According to Marxists 
the capitalist system is bound to break down sooner or later (or in the Leninist version leads to 
imperialism and in the end to a destructive conflict among the nations of the world). Here Gilpin 
also sees two different branches, a “revolutionary” kind that rejects the established system and 
a “social-democratic” kind which rather wants to make sufficient reforms (Gilpin 1987, p. 34).  
He points out that Marxism has developed in a system-compatible form which is very much 
like the social-democrat version of liberalism. Real rejection of capitalism is quite absent from 
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the political system of the United States, so we can propose a slightly different typology with 
the following three ideologies: Nationalism, neoliberalism and social-democracy. 
Figure 1: Adapted version of Robert Gilpin’s typology of ideologies in the political economy  
 
 
Why tax cooperation is essentially a social-democratic concern 
Now if we apply these ideologies to the subjects of tax cooperation and free trade we can see 
the difference. The arguments for free trade mostly rely on the overall welfare of the world and 
aim at reducing government intervention in favor of the market. 
In tax matters, we have seen that big states should aspire to international cooperation principally 
so that they can independently choose their level of government revenue and their level of re-
distribution.  
In the neoliberal ideology, these are goals of second order since there is a preference for a small 
government and low level of redistribution. Equality means equal legal treatment and not literal 
economic equality. Some might even consider tax competition as desirable for its disciplining 
effect on “inefficient” government spending (Tiebout 1956). 
The nationalist perspective is principally in favor of a strong welfare state and a strong inter-
ventionist economic policies. But it also considers the world economy as a zero-sum game. 
Thus, international tax cooperation would not be a first choice, especially if it favors relatively 
more other countries who have more difficulties to raise revenue than the USA (developing 
countries) or who because of their history already have a big welfare state (Continental Euro-
pean countries).  
The social-democratic perspective is both in favor of redistribution and a welfare state and does 
not consider the government as an enemy. Also, international cooperation is welcome, no mat-
ter if we regard the roots of social-democracy as Liberal or Marxist. Liberalism is only con-
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cerned with absolute and not with relative gains, and Marxism has an internationalist and altru-
ist perspective. Thus, the case for international tax cooperation essentially stems from social-
democrat ideology. 
 Revenue raising/redistribu-
tion are important goals 
Positive-sum vision of the 
world 
Economic Nationalism + - 
Neoliberalism - + 
Social-Democracy + + 
 
 
3. Historical evolution of tax policy norms 
Several studies examined the role of norms in US tax policy: Probably one of the first books on 
the subject was written by Louis Eisenstein in 1961. Eisenstein shows that there are three types 
of arguments that are made about taxation: The first kind invokes the principle of “ability to 
pay”, the second the principle of “barriers and deterrents” and the third one the principle of 
“equity” (Eisenstein 1961, p. 12). The principle of “ability to pay” refers to a progressive tax 
system, a system which relies on redistribution. The idea of “barriers and deterrents” on the 
other hand refers to the idea that taxes should not take away the incentives from businessmen 
and investors for investing and doing business. His purpose however was to demonstrate that 
these justifications are vague and represent nothing else than interests of certain groups. He 
finally shows that “equity” is a principle that is invoked by everyone, but basically meaningless.  
In a broader perspective, Steinmo subsumes the history of norms that guided US tax policy 
throughout the 20th century. He shows that the conceptions of what a good tax system is and 
what tax policy should do were far from static. At the end 19th century, the tax system could 
not really be called “system” and was highly regressive as taxes applied mostly to quite arbi-
trarily chosen consumer goods. (Steinmo 2003, p. 209) 
At the beginning of the 20th century progressivity was introduced into the system, due to better 
organization of labor and the high costs of the war which necessitated a larger contribution of 
those who could afford. At that time, the idea was born that taxes should be levied accordingly 
to the ability to pay of the people (Steinmo 2003, p. 210), so that after the Second World War 
the economy was managed through numerous tax incentives and very high marginal rates (91% 
for top incomes). Tax policy was deemed an appropriate tool to achieve specific microeconomic 
goals (Steinmo 2003, p. 214). This period might have been the ideal moment to develop a tax 
cooperation regime, but there was no need for such a regime at that moment. Tax competition 
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became an issue only after capital controls were widely abolished and the world economy be-
came more integrated.  
The proliferation of incentives and thus the complication of the tax code in the 1960s to the 
1980s, however, had the side-effect, that resourceful people and corporations could easier avoid 
taxation, by employing tax professionals to take advantage of exceptions. As a consequence, it 
is the complexity of the tax code that made it (unintendedly) regressive. (Steinmo 2003, p. 216). 
Thus, after Reagan's reforms of 1981 at first further complicated the tax code, there was a wide-
spread agreement to eliminate exceptions in 1986 and reduce rates (Steinmo 2003, pp. 219–
220). Corporate tax rates, for example, were cut from 46% to 34%, and all in all the tax code 
became less progressive. Another study shows, that at that moment lots of other countries re-
sponded to these reforms, which contributed to the rise of the neoliberalism as principal ideol-
ogy in tax policy. This shows that choices made in the USA have the particular power to influ-
ence other countries’ choices by making the first move (Swank 2015). 
It is also at that moment, that tax competition is used for the first time as an argument: It is 
argued that the 1986 reforms were a reaction to the greater mobility of capital, and thus inevi-
table. But to quote Steinmo: “To be sure, the bogey-man of ‘globalisation’ and the threat of 
capital exit in the late 1980s and 1990s provided a powerful justification for tax policies which 
tax economists and tax policy advisers had long wanted to make—but when one looks more 
closely at the timing of the reforms and the arguments laid out on their behalf, it is difficult to 
argue that it was international competition that ‘made us do it’” (Steinmo 2003, p. 230). 
Finally, Michael Webb found in a study of the OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative5 started 
in 1998 that a contradiction in norms can be used by materially weaker participants in a nego-
tiation to achieve a favorable outcome. In that way, the debate around the OECD Harmful Tax 
Practices initiative could be “won” by tax havens, as norms which were in the end favorable to 
tax competition were prevailing among policymakers of the OECD and of its major member 
states such as most of all the USA. Next to the principle of sovereignty in taxation, Webb ex-
plained that a neoliberal mindset among the policymakers prevented action against tax compe-
tition. According to Webb, the “American and British governments believed that tax havens 
played a valuable role in the liberalization of international capital flows”, whereas rather social-
democratic oriented countries with high taxes were hoping for more international cooperation 
(Webb 2004, p. 797). 
 
                                                 
5 The OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative was the first multilateral tentative to combat tax competition. 
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This literature tells us three important things: First, tax policy in the USA has been subject to 
change during the last century and oscillated between rather social-democratic and rather ne-
oliberal norm. Second, the shape of tax policy cannot solely be explained by mechanic forces. 
There is rather, as Steinmo argues, a "dynamic and interactive process" between ideas, interests 
and institutions (Steinmo 2003, p. 207). Third, the USA has influenced a great number of other 
countries in its tax policy choices since the reform of 1986. The result was a preeminence of 
neoliberal norms which contributed to the fact that tax competition was not effectively ruled 
out in the Harmful Tax Competition initiative at the end of the century. 
In the recent decades, more knowledge about the harms of tax competition, tax evasion and tax 
avoidance has been collected, and there are more and more academics and NGOs like The Tax 
Justice Network or Oxfam calling for tax justice (Eccleston 2013, p. 119). Also, more attention 
has been raised towards economic inequality, especially in the USA with the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, which spread critique of the economic system in the wake of the financial 
crisis. Even prominent voices like investor Warren Buffett, which were rather expected to be 
on the “neoliberal side” joined the ranks (Buffett 2011).  
But on the other hand, there is also a regain of other voices which for example call for more 
nationalism (“Make America great again”) which might compromise efforts towards more in-
ternational cooperation. 
 
4. Methodology 
To find out which are the dominant norms in US tax policy today and how they have evolved 
over the last decades I decided to analyze what policymakers in the USA say about tax policy: 
I wanted to know how they justify policies, what they say should be the purpose of tax policy 
and what the tax system in general should look like. I collected the necessary data principally 
from two sources: Publications of the Congress of the United States and articles from the United 
States’ biggest news agency, Associated Press. Not all statements about tax policy in AP nec-
essarily come from policymakers (they could also come from academics, lobby groups, com-
mentators, etc.), but a rough check confirmed that a great majority of statements about tax pol-
icy are quotes from politicians. 
The data was taken from the news database Factiva, where a search query was conducted, con-
taining keywords and key-phrases that indicate a normative statement on tax policy. These 
phrases were all possible combinations of words like “tax policy”, “fiscal reform”, “tax code”6, 
                                                 
6 I did not use the word “tax” alone, because the quantity of text material would have been too large to process and 
because I wanted to focus on rather general statements and not analyze the purposes of very precise measures.  
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with words that often occur in statements with normative content, such as “should”, “must”, 
“need to”, “good”, “bad”, etc. The whole list of search terms can be consulted in Annex 1.  
To adequately detect changes over time, all articles from January 1st 1997 to March 31st 2017 
were considered. It needs to be noted, however, that Congress documents were only available 
from January 1st 2007. 
From the search query 5153 documents with a total of 9800 sentences containing the keywords 
were obtained. After deleting the doubles, 7446 sentences containing one of the key phrases 
were left, which then constituted the material for content analysis.  
Out of these, I manually read 2000 randomly selected sentences and tried to classify each nor-
mative judgment into a category. Whenever an argument occurred new to me, I created a new 
category, otherwise I assigned an already existing category. At the end of the process, I had 
developed thirteen different categories. It is important to note that out of the 7446 statements 
40% were sampling errors. They could not be attributed to any category because the statement 
did not have any normative content, for example a sentence like “There is a strong need for tax 
reform”. 
Of course, another reader probably would not come up with the same system of classification, 
but that lies in the nature of hermeneutic research.  
Along the process, I searched for recurring keywords or word combinations which indicated a 
category, for example the word “attract” for the category “Competition” or the word “middle-
class” for the category “Support of ordinary people”. I continuously improved the list, as I read 
more and more statements. This permits on the one hand greater transparency of my interpre-
tation (the list of key-words can be found in Annex 2), and on the other hand the automatic 
categorization (or coding, in the jargon of content analysis) of the sentences I could not read 
myself.  
As on average, 77% of the categories were assigned correctly like in the sentences I read man-
ually, I am confident that most of the non-read sentences are also categorized correctly. At least 
it is possible to assume that errors should not be too unequally distributed over time. Consult 
Annex 2 for an overview of the automatic-coding errors for each category and a description of 
the error calculation method.  
 
5. Results: What are the important principles of tax policy? 
Thirteen themes were recurring throughout the corpus of statements, meaning thirteen different 
principles and justifications for tax policy.  
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Three are social groups whose well-being should be the goal of tax policy: “Ordinary” people 
(middle-class, working people etc.), business, and small business. Two are concrete shapes of 
the tax code: flatness and small government. The former category includes proposals for low-
ering of marginal tax rates and broadening the base, essentially through less special exceptions 
in the tax code. The latter category subsumes all kinds of proposals, which aim for taxes to be 
as low as possible so that the government’s influence in the economy is as low as possible. Four 
categories are goals which should be achieved through tax policy: growth, job creation, com-
petitiveness and raising revenue for government. 
Three categories are principles to which tax policy should obey: Fairness, simplicity and con-
tribution of the well-off. Finally, one category was assigned to special mentioning of the United 
States and the Americans as the aim of tax policy, because the intention of the speaker could be 
different if he just talks about support for business or if he wants to highlight that it is American 
businesses here at home who should get support. 40% of the statements were not assigned to 
any category, 26% of the statements were attributed to one category, and 34% contained more 
than one category, a few of them even almost all of them. A list with a short description, an 
example and the evolution over the 20 last years of each category is provided in Annex 3. Figure 
2 shows the absolute frequencies. 
Figure 2: Frequencies of categories7 
 
 
Indeed, only a few of these principles and justifications for tax policy are directly concerned 
with redistribution or raising revenue, the biggest problems that arise through tax competition 
                                                 
7 To obtain a figure as accurate as possible, the frequencies of automatically assigned categories were adjusted by 
the margin of error for each category, obtained via the comparison of manually coded statements with the auto-
matic coding system. 
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and they do not figure among the ones that are mentioned the most often. Moreover, the cate-
gory “Contribution of the well-off” rather lost than gained shares of the discourse.  
More than 1200 statements, that is every fifth of the statements containing a normative state-
ment, invoke the principle of simplicity. Indeed, there seems to be a broad consensus that the 
tax code is too long and incomprehensible. It is difficult to associate the demand for simplicity 
with one or another ideology. Of course, a very simple tax code is probably rather a tax code 
without much progressivity. However, a simpler could also be a more progressive tax code 
because the complexity and the associated costs of tax compliance make it regressive: The Tax-
payer Advocate Service which fulfills the function of an ombudsman at the U.S. Internal Rev-
enue Service showed that the federal tax code grows steadily: They counted 3.7 million words 
in 2007 in the Internal Revenue Code (which only contains federal taxes), around 5 times more 
than in 1975. They further calculated that it takes taxpayers more than 7.6 billion hours yearly 
to comply which would make tax compliance, if it was an industry, the largest of the U.S. 
(Taxpayer Advocate Service 2008). 
Fairness is the second most invoked principle. Of course, this includes statements like “Tax 
policy should be fair to business” or “…to the middle-class”, or “…to agriculture”, etc. and 
thus does not say a lot yet about the normative conception behind, even more if we recall what 
Louis Eisenstein already said about the use of the word “equity” back in 1961. Nevertheless, it 
is noteworthy that fairness is still often referred to. But it is also important to notice that it is 
referred to less and less as can be seen in Annex 3.  
In terms of the evolution over the period, the categories “Growth”, “Support of America(ns)”, 
“Competition” and “Jobs” are becoming more important whereas “Fairness”, “Raising reve-
nue” and (in recent years) “Contribution of the well-off” lose shares in the discourse. 
The case of “Growth” and “Jobs” is particularly interesting because the evolution seems to be 
in connection to the financial crisis: the shares of those norms have risen significantly since 
2008. 
Figure 3: Shares of “Jobs“ and “Growth“ 
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This has probably something to do with one of the crisis paradoxes. Even if the crisis was in-
terpreted as a failure of the economic system and many voices called for profound change, the 
absence of growth and unemployment made these objectives relatively more important as pol-
icy goals. 
 
Is neoliberalism still dominant? 
In 2004, Michael Webb said that neoliberal policy norms contributed to the prevention of ef-
fective tax cooperation. What is the state in the USA today? To answer this question, it is nec-
essary to further reduce the information and to “recategorize” the different categories in broader 
categories that represent the three ideologies introduced earlier. 
The categories that can be associated to economic nationalism are thus “Competitiveness”8 and 
“Support of Americans”. As neoliberalism highlights the role of the market and of private en-
terprise, we can assign the categories “Small government”, “Support of business” and “Flat-
ness”. Social-democracy is rather preoccupied with correcting the deficiencies of the market 
and stronger state intervention we can thus attribute the categories “Support of ordinary peo-
ple”, “Support of small business”, “Contribution of the well-off” and “Raising revenue”.  
One difficult question is to appoint “growth” and “jobs” to one of these ideologies. Eisenstein 
wrote in 1961 that growth is a principle everyone can agree on and thus without ideology. 
However, critical authors like Davies associates growth with neoliberal ideology. According to 
Davies, neoliberalism tries to present itself as neutral, although the underlying goal is economic 
growth (Davies 2014). If we follow Gilpin’s classification of economic ideologies, growth or 
associated terms such as prosperity and economic development are the primary goal in every 
ideology, except maybe Marxism. Nevertheless, growth and economic development is most 
commonly measured by the output of the economy which in turn is indifferent to social equality 
or national interest and is thus principally a neoliberal goal. Thus, I decided to count “growth”-
statements as neoliberal statements.  
Associating the goal “jobs” to one ideology is even more difficult, since everybody wants to 
prevent unemployment. Sometimes a statement including the category “jobs” might have a 
more nationalist tone like in “The fiscal code should secure American jobs” or sometimes a 
more neoliberal tone like in “Taxes should be low to favor job creation”. In both cases, however, 
                                                 
8 Of course, competition is a principle which is at the heart of neoliberalism. A “competitive” tax system or a tax 
system that favors the “competitiveness of American firms” belong to the perspective of economic nationalism, 
because it presupposes a zero-sum vision of the economic world, where gains of one country are at the expense of 
another.   
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the statement would include another category (“Support of Americans” in the former example 
and “Small government” in the latter), so that they would already be correctly associated. Thus, 
I decided not to attribute “jobs” to one of the categories, as well as “Fairness” and “Simplicity” 
for reasons pointed out above. The table below resumes which category was attributed to each 
ideological family: 
Economic Nationa-
lism Neoliberalism Social-Democracy Not attributed 
Competition Support of business Support of ordinary people Simplicity 
Support of America(ns Flatness Support of small business Fairness 
  Small government Contribution of the well-off Jobs 
  Growth Raising revenue   
 
One can see in figure 4 that while the share of social-democratic norms remains stable in the 
discourse, neoliberalism becomes stronger. However, the rise is principally caused by the 
“growth” component which a reader might not consider as a neoliberal goal. Otherwise, the 
shares of neoliberalism would also remain stable. The most significant result is that economic 
nationalism gets more important in the tax policy discourse. 
 
Figure 4: Shares of the three ideologies in the tax policy discourse9 
 
   
                                                 
9 The values are obtained by counting how many statements contain a category associated to one of the ideologies 
in a given year and then dividing the number by the total number of statements containing any category in that 
year. The values are weighted by the values of  “correctness” and “completeness” calculated for each category. 
See Annex 2.  
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6. Interpretation – What is the outlook for international tax coopera-
tion? 
How can these observations be interpreted? In the USA, there seems to be a consensus that the 
tax system should be simple or at least simpler as the status quo. Further, whereas neoliberal 
norms are dominant, they cannot pretend exclusivity. A significant part of the discourse in-
cludes the middle class and working people. Policy makers often highlight that the tax system 
should do something for them. At the same time, explicit demands for progressive taxation and 
the contribution of the well-off are becoming comparatively relatively less frequent. Instead, 
nationalist appeals, especially the wish to restore competitiveness of American firms through 
the tax system, are uttered more often. 
The consequence is that the normative environment for comprehensive cooperation in tax mat-
ters has not significantly improved during the last decades. If anything, the surge of nationalism 
rather favors unilateral measures against tax evasion such as FATCA, which might have a lim-
ited utility for the United States but probably no broad impact on the phenomenon globally. On 
the other hand, the will to engage in real tax competition through lowering of marginal corporate 
tax rates has probably become stronger. 
There are reasons to presume that the same actors with the same interests have only changed 
their discourse. The financial crisis has led to widespread criticism of neoliberalism and glob-
alization, but has not led to more calls for redistributive tax policy or more state intervention in 
the economy. “We need a tax system built for growth” is a call which is uttered more frequently, 
whereas the principle of fairness is becoming less important. There just seems to be a greater 
necessity to justify policy additionally with references to national welfare. Whereas this might 
lead to lesser acceptance of clearly illegal practices such as tax evasion by wealthy individuals, 
the effect on corporate tax avoidance and real tax competition is more ambiguous: Many coun-
tries lose more revenue compared to GDP from tax avoidance than the US. However, almost 
all the developed countries and potential “competitors” of the US are less affected (Cobham, 
Janský 2017, p. 26). Nevertheless, the majority of multinationals that make use of tax avoidance 
practices are US based10, so a defender of economic nationalist could potentially argue that it 
is mostly American firms that profit from multinationals. So the effect of a more nationalist 
                                                 
10 Cobham, Janský 2015 estimated worlwide tax revenue losses due to tax avoidance practices of US multinationals 
at between 133 and 200 billion $ annually. Cobham, Janský 2017 estimated the total worldwide tax revenue losses 
due to practices by firms of any nationality at around 500 billion $. The numbers are not directly comparable, 
because the methods and data used in both studies are different. Nevertheless, they provide some evidence to the 
assumption that US multinationals probably have the greatest share in global tax avoidance. 
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perspective on tax policy is ambiguous concerning the fight against tax avoidance of multina-
tional corporations. 
As country-against-country competition is the essence of nationalist economic policy, real tax 
competition certainly gets fiercer when nationalist norms get more important in tax policy.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to make one more optimistic argument. If tax policy is indeed rela-
tively more oriented by nationalist norms, one important argument in favor of tax cooperation 
actually gains validity in the USA: The erosion of de facto sovereignty. The argument goes that 
in presence of tax competition governments cannot freely decide about their tax level anymore 
because they have to take into account the choices of other governments (Rixen 2016, p. 329). 
Whether a government accepts this argument could depend on whether it actually takes into 
account the action of foreign states.  
In the US, arguments about what the rest of the world does have until recently not dominated 
the debate11. If the USA engaged in tax competition, they probably did not do it as a reaction to 
what other states were doing, but rather because policymakers believed that low taxes were 
good for growth, job creation or for disciplining the government. Thus, policymakers did not 
perceive themselves in a race-to-the-bottom and did not actually feel constrained in their 
choices. But the data shows that the share of competitiveness arguments is increasing. This 
might eventually lead to a greater consciousness among policymakers that de facto sovereignty 
is indeed eroding and that sovereignty-pooling in form of greater tax policy coordination could 
be necessary to restore it. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to trace the evolution of tax policy norms in the United States during 
the last 20 years and to evaluate if there is a favorable normative environment for a strong 
international cooperative regime in tax policy. It was argued that tax policy norms in the USA 
are particularly important for international cooperation, because the situation between different 
countries is an asymmetric prisoner’s dilemma. To solve the dilemma, strong institutions which 
entail sovereignty-pooling and the will of powerful states to enforce the rules are necessary. 
One prerequisite is that the powerful states, and most importantly the USA, have this will – or 
that the norms that guide tax policy permit such a solution. It was argued that among three 
principal ideologies of the political economy (economic nationalism, neoliberalism and social-
                                                 
11 In other domains, such as trade policy, competitiveness has already been an important concept in US policy 
debates since the 1980s (see for example Krugman 1999).  
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democracy), only social-democracy clearly favors international cooperation to solve problems 
of tax competition.   
The paper showed that there is no “neoliberal consensus” among policymakers, like it is some-
times supposed. However, the events of the last years did not strengthen social-democracy. 
Neoliberalist norms rather became stronger and economic nationalism (the “competitiveness” 
discourse), which was rather irrelevant at the beginning of the century, now is an important 
element of the debate on tax policy. Thus, the outlook for US-backed international cooperation 
is not favorable, even if a discourse which is more focused on competitiveness might eventually 
contribute to the perception that there actually is a prisoner’s dilemma among US policymakers. 
One final word needs to be said about the applied method’s limitations: Only a fraction of the 
tax policy discourse was analyzed, and isolated sentences were taken as indicators for the whole 
discourse policymakers are saying. Furthermore, every statement was counted like any other, 
without taking into account who is talking. Yet it surely is important which actor in the political 
sphere holds which conception of tax policy. If international cooperation in tax matters is en-
gaged or not might more depend on the ideas of the President, the Secretary of the Treasury or 
the majority in Congress (see Hakelberg 2016 for a discussion of this kind of variables). Nev-
ertheless, the norms among policymakers have a consequence on the conceptions of key actors 
and vice versa. Thus, they can reveal something about the long-run tendency: Are the ideas of 
the American political elite moving in a direction that is favorable to international tax cooper-
ation? Rather not.  
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Search terms 
 
 fiscal code  has to   1 word 
 fiscal policies  should   1 word 
 fiscal policy  ought   1 word 
 fiscal reform  must   1 word 
 fiscal reforms  have to   1 word 
 fiscal system  need*   1 word 
all combinations  fiscal systems with purpose*  at a distance  4 words 
of tax code  principle*  of 4 words 
 tax policies  goal*   4 words 
 tax policy  aim*   4 words 
 tax reform  favor*   4 words 
 tax reforms  good   4 words 
 tax system  bad   4 words 
 tax systems  promot*   4 words 
 taxation  make*   4 words 
   ensure*   4 words 
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Annex 2: Keywords for categories 
 
Category Keywords Cor-
rectness 
Completeness 
Simplicity "simple"; "clean"; "easier"; "certainty"; "complicated"; 
"complex"; "streamlin"; "predictab"; "simplicity"; "sim-
plif" 
89% 94% 
Fairness "fair"; "equal"; "equitabl"; "inequit" 93% 98% 
Support of busi-
ness 
"investor"; "private-sector"; "entrepreneur"; "employer"; 
"corporation"; "industry"; "industries"; "regulation"; 
"manufactur"; "job creator"; "investor"; "enterprise"; "in-
novator"; "private sector"; "business" AND NOT ("busi-
ness cycle"; "tax avoidance"; "small business"); "com-
pan" AND NOT ("tax avoidance"; "small compan") 
62% 84% 
Growth "grow"; "economic development"; "GDP"; "stimulate * 
economy"; "boost * economy"; "economic recovery"; 
"improve * economy"; "expand * economy"; "economic 
expansion"; "boost economy"; "economic prosperity"; 
"expand* econom"; "productiv"; "strong* economy"; 
"economic opportunity"; "efficien" 
73% 82% 
Support of ordi-
nary people 
"family"; "families"; "middle class"; "poverty"; "work-
ers"; "least able to pay"; "child"; "wage"; "middle-class"; 
"lower income"; "low income"; "lower-income"; "el-
derly"; "impoverished"; "the poor"; "poorest"; "middle-
income"; "middle income"; "working" AND NOT 
("working group") 
76% 79% 
Support of Ame-
rica(ns) 
"America"; "United States"; "at home" 80% 97% 
Flatness "flat"; "special interest"; "winner"; "single out"; "con-
sumption-based"; "special-interest"; "broaden * base"; 
"base-broad"; "base broad"; "broad* base"; "broad-based" 
83% 46% 
Competition "compet"; "attract"; "overseas"; "middle of the pack"; "re-
locat" 
87% 90% 
Jobs "job"; "hire"; "employment" 71% 97% 
Raising revenue "education"; "balance * budget"; "financing"; "reduc* * 
deficit"; "deficit reduction"; "reduc* deficit"; "revenue" 
AND NOT ("revenue department"; "revenue*neutral"; 
"Internal Revenue"; "revenue and taxation") 
47% 73% 
Contribution of the 
well-off 
"wealthy"; "wealthie"; "millionaire"; "buffett"; "fair* 
share"; "ability to pay"; "regressiv*"; "billionaire"; "pro-
gressive"; "richest"; "sham corporation"; "tax avoidance"; 
"avoid taxation"; "tax evasion"; "avoid paying tax"; "priv-
ileged" 
77% 76% 
Support of small 
business 
"small* business"; "small* compan" 87% 90% 
Small government "government * limit"; "tax hike"; "spending * control"; 
"control * spending"; "burdensome"; "avoid tax in-
crease"; "size of the government" 
67% 34% 
 
The values of “Correctness” and “Completeness” compare the automatic assignment of cate-
gories with the help of the keywords with the manual categorizing. 70% “Correctness” means 
that in 70% of the cases where the computer assigned a category, the human being also did. 
70% “Completeness” in turn means that in 70% of the cases, where the human being assigned 
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a category, the computer also did. A high value of “Correctness” and a low value of “Com-
pleteness” means that computer underestimates the total number of cases containing the cate-
gory. A high value of “Completeness” and a low value of “Correctness” means that the com-
puter probably overestimates the number of cases.  
The total value of “Correctness” for all categories is 77% and the total value for completeness 
is 86%.  
 
Annex 3: Description and evolution of categories 
The number “A” is the average percentage of statements that contain the category. 
The number “b” is the slope of the linear trend. 1 means that the share of statements that contain the category rises 
on average 1% each year.  
Category Description Example Evolution 1997-2017 
Simplicity Complexity of tax policy 
should be reduced 
"Participants agreed that simplicity 
should be a guiding principle for 
moving forward with tax reform." 
 
Fairness Fairness is mentioned as a 
principle 
"We also should be closing many of 
the loopholes that make the tax code 
so unfair."  
 
Support of 
Business 
Satisfying the needs of 
business is the purpose of 
tax policy 
“Our tax code should create a path-
way for innovators and entrepreneurs 
-and not erect barriers to their suc-
cess.” 
 
Growth Economic growth and de-
velopment is the purpose of 
tax policy 
"The tax code should promote sav-
ings and investment, the drivers of 
long-term growth."  
 
Support of or-
dinary people 
Tax policy should promote 
the well-being of the mid-
dle-class, families, working 
people 
“It mustn't single out any one area for 
huge tax increases, nor should it 
make the tax system more of a bur-
den on the state's poorest citizens.” 
 
Support of 
America(ns) 
Special emphasis that it is 
America or Americans that 
should be the aim of tax 
policy 
"Real tax reform must encourage 
these corporations to bring this 
money back to the United States to 
invest in our businesses and increase 
wages for our workers."  
 
Flatness The tax code should be flat 
(lower marginal rates with 
a broader base) 
"The foundation defines a good state 
tax system as one that treats all tax-
payers the same and levies low, flat 
rates on the broadest bases possible." 
 
Competition Tax policy must be com-
petitive, permit that firms 
can compete with foreign 
firms 
"Baucus called for revisions to the 
tax code, saying it needs to support 
American competitiveness." 
 
A: 25%  
b: -0,85 
A: 21%  
b: 1,02 
A: 13%  
b: 0,15 
A: 13%  
b: 0,71 
A: 17%  
b: 1,45 
A: 19%  
b: 0,51 
A: 23%  
b: 0,45 
A: 27%  
b: 0,19 
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Category Description Example Evolution 1997-2017 
Jobs Tax policy has to encour-
age job creation 
“The last thing our tax code should 
do is penalize people for finding 
jobs” 
 
Raising reve-
nue 
The function of tax policy 
to raise enough revenue for 
different functions of gov-
ernment.  
“An overhaul of the nation's tax code 
should raise additional revenue to re-
duce massive budget deficits and 
should help strengthen the economy, 
[...].” 
 
Contribution 
of the Well-
off 
Tax policy should be pro-
gressive; everyone must 
pay his fair share in respect 
of what he's able to pay. 
Mentioning of tax evasion 
is included here 
"Tax reform should follow the Buf-
fett rule: If you make more than $1 
million a year, you should not pay 
less than 30 percent in taxes." 
 
Support of 
small busi-
ness 
Well-being of small busi-
ness in particular must be 
promoted through tax pol-
icy 
"This bill will also make the tax code 
less of a disadvantage for our small 
businesses by letting them offer a 
range of benefits on par with their 
larger competitors." 
 
Small 
Government 
Size and influence of the 
government should be as 
small as possible 
"The tax code needs to be simpli-
fied, and the power of the Internal 
Revenue Service greatly dimin-
ished."  
 
 
A: 3%  
b: -0,01 
A: 7%  
b: -0,09 
A: 6%  
b: 0,38 
A: 11%  
b: 0,83 
A: 11%  
b: -0,39 
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